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I. INTRODUCTION
[C]reditors who cause debtors' financial ruin should
not be allowed to use the courts as their collection
agents. The United States courts should not be
enforcers for loan sharks. The Bankruptcy Code
currently gives courts that power to equitably
subordinate creditors who act improperly. But... it
is applied inconsistently.
Equitable subordination provides bankruptcy courts with
the authority to place the first lien position of a self-enriching
secured creditor in an inferior position to that of other secured or
unsecured creditors.2 Historically, bankruptcy judges have been
reluctant to use their power to subordinate3 a secured creditor's
unjust claims in circumstances where they are not fiduciaries. For
• • 5
purposes of this Case Comment, a non-insider refers to any
creditor that does not have fiduciary obligations.
1. Abusive Credit Card Practices and Bankruptcy: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony of Adam Levitin, Associate Professor
of Law, Georgetown University Law Center).
2. See ELIZABETH WARREN, CHAPTER 11: REORGANIZING AMERICAN
BUSINESSES, 123-24 (Vicki Been et al. eds., Aspen Publishers 2008).
3. Throughout this Case Comment the terms subordinate and equitably
subordinate will be used interchangeably.
4. See e.g., Philip V. Martino, Equitable Subordination of Non-Insider Claims,
DLA PIPER PUBL'N, May 2007, http://www.dlapiper.com/equitablesubordination_
non-insider_claims/ ("Equitable subordination is typically applied when a fiduciary
misuses his position to the disadvantage of other creditors, or a third party controls
the debtor to the disadvantage of other creditors, or a third party actually defrauds
other creditors.").
5. The term insider in this Case Comment includes officers, directors and
shareholders of a debtor that have fiduciary duties.
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The recent interim order in In re Yellowstone Mountain
Club, LLC (Yellowstone) 6 suggests that courts may be more
inclined to subordinate claims of secured creditors, including non-
insiders, who have engaged in predatory lending practices.7 This
Case Comment examines the doctrinal difficulties in applying
equitable subordination as a remedy when the relationship,
specifically between a creditor and the debtor, does not give rise to
a fiduciary duty.
In May 2009, in Yellowstone, a Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Montana subordinated the $232 million secured first
lien position of Credit Suisse Group AG (Credit Suisse) on a
luxurious ski resort to that of its unsecured creditors because
Credit Suisse's commercial loan was so "overreaching and self-
serving that they shocked the conscience of the court.",8 Judge
Ralph B. Kirscher ruled in favor of the unsecured creditors,
specifying Credit Suisse's "naked greed" and "predatory lending
practices" as misconduct that warranted equitable subordination.9
This novel application of equitable subordination caught the
attention of lenders (and their attorneys) concerned that their first
lien positions may be subordinated due to predatory creditor
misconduct. ° Thus, lenders fear that they are at greater risk for
loss where once they thought they were secured.I
6. See Credit Suisse v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re
Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC), No. 08-61570-11, Adv. No. 09-00014, 2009 WL
3094930 (Bankr. D. Mont. May 12, 2009) (partial and interim order).
7. See In re Yellowstone Mountain Club LLC-The Pitfalls of "Equitable
Subordination" for the Unwary Lender, WHITE & CASE BANK FIN., June 2009, http://
www.whitecase.com/alert-in-re-yellowstone-mountain-club-lcthe-pitfalls-of-eq
uitable-subordination-for-the-unwary-lender-06-04-2009/ [hereinafter Unwary
Lender] (PDF available at link).
8. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, No. 08-61570-11, at *8-10.
9. Id. at *9; see Diane Davis, Credit Suisse's 'Predatory Loan' Shocks
Conscience of Court; Results in Subordination, 21 BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) 760, 760-
62, June 4, 2009.
10. See Unwary Lender, supra note 7, at 2; Bankruptcy Court Equitably
Subordinates Claim of Non-Insider Senior Lender, CHOATE HALL & STEWART LLP,
June 8, 2009, http://www.choate.com/media/pnc/2/media.1982.pdf [hereinafter Non-
Insider Senior Lender] (recognizing the unusual ruling in In re Yellowstone).
11. Unwary Lender, supra note 7, at 2; see MARK RABINOWITZ & MATHEW
ROTENBERG, PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM IMPROPER LENDER CONDUCr DURING
THE WORKOUT, Bus. WORKOUTS MANUAL §8:26, available at Westlaw BUSWORK §
8:26 (Matthew W. Kavanaugh, Donald Lee Rome, & Randye B. Soref eds., 2009)
(noting that subordinated claims are not necessarily disallowed).
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The doctrine of equitable subordination is founded on the
principle that creditor misconduct disadvantages other creditors inb a n k r u tc y . 1 2
bankruptcy proceedings. Courts have labeled creditor
misconduct as "inequitable conduct" that results in injury to other
creditors. Bankruptcy courts apply the doctrine in an effort to
promote fairness and justice 4 but inconsistently define the
boundaries of inequitable conduct."
This Case Comment will argue that Judge Kirscher
correctly subordinated Credit Suisse's first lien position to that of
Yellowstone Club's other creditors. 6  Part II of this Case
Comment presents the facts and procedural history of Yellowstone
and explains the court's rationale in equitably subordinatingC r e d t S i s s e s • 1 7
Credit Suisse's claim. Part III explains how the application of
12. E.g., ROBERT E. GINSBERG, ROBERT D. MARTIN & SUSAN V. KELLEY,
GINSBERG & MARTIN ON BANKRUPTCY §10.11 (Aspen Publishers, Inc. 2009)
[hereinafter BANKRUPTCY §10.11] ("Equitable subordination gives the bankruptcy
court broad powers to undo inequality in the claim position of a creditor that will
produce injustice or unfairness to other creditors with respect to distribution of the
bankruptcy estate."); See generally Wendell H. Adair et al., Equitable Subordination:
A Powerful Remedy, J. CORP. RENEWAL, Oct. 1, 2000, http://www.turnaround.org/
Publications/Articles.aspx?objectlD=1352 ("Typically, the actions of certain creditors
have a negative impact upon the rights of other creditors and there are few
responsive legal remedies available to an affected creditor.").
13. E.g., Adair et al., supra note 12.
14. Martino, supra note 4 ("Equitable subordination under section 510(c) is
designed to 'undo or offset any inequity in the claim position of a creditor that will
produce injustice or unfairness to other creditors in terms of the bankruptcy
results."'(citing In re Kreisler, 331 B.R. 364, 380 (N.D. Ill. 2005))).
15. WARREN, supra note 2, at 126.
16. See generally Mara Der Hovanesian & Dean Foust, Why This Real Estate
Bust is Different, BUS. WK., Nov. 5, 2009, at 46, available at http://www.business
week.com/magazine/content/09_46/b4155042792563.htm ("Some lenders may have
drummed up business for themselves, enticing borrowers with more money than they
needed. Consider Credit Suisse's $375 million loan to the Yellowstone Club in Big
Sky, Mont., one of the starkest examples of poor underwriting in recent memory.").
But see Jo Ann J. Brighton et al., Yellowstone: New Standard for Lender Liability in
Today's Economic Climate, AM. BANKR. J. 28, Sept. 28, 2009, available at WL 28-
SEP Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 28 (disagreeing with the subordination of Credit Suisse's
claim because they did not have a fiduciary duty to Yellowstone Club and that it is
universally expected for a lender to act in its own self interest in bankruptcy
proceedings); Ken Rathburn, "Kreisler or Yellowstone?" The Reach of the Equitable
Subordination Doctrine, BANK. AND FIN. L. REPORT, August 21, 2009, http://
www.bankingandfinancelawreport.com/2009/08/articles/bankruptcy/kreisler-or-yell
owstone-the-reach-of-the-equitable-subordination-doctrine/ (acknowledging that In
re Yellowstone is an "outlier" case because of its unique facts).
17. See infra Part II, pp. 498-504. The application of equitable subordination will
be examined in relation to commercial bankruptcy filings. The Administrative Office
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equitable subordination in Yellowstone differs from the traditional
equitable subordination cases. 8 Additionally, Part III explains
why courts underuse subordination as a remedy where parties are
non-insiders.' 9  Part IV argues for the use of equitable
subordination in circumstances where non-insider creditors engage
in underwriting misconduct and considers the possible implications
that Yellowstone can have on non-insiders.' °
II. YELLOWSTONE: A BANKRUPTCY COURT'S CRITICAL EYE ON
PREDATORY LENDERS
In 1999, "timber magnate"21 Tim Blixseth and his then wife,
Edra, established the "world's only private ski and golf
community," Yellowstone Mountain Club (Yellowstone Club).22
While the Blixseths financed Yellowstone Club by selling equity
shares to "Pioneer and Frontier Members," they retained control
of approximately eighty-seven percent of Yellowstone Club
through their Oregon holding company, Blixseth Group, Inc.
(BGI).23 In addition to equity financing, the Blixseths "carried a
debt load ranging from a low of approximately $4 to $5 million to a
of U.S. Courts reported that commercial bankruptcy filings increased sixty-three
percent from July 1, 2007 to June 30, 2008, with 33, 822 cases being filed during that
time. For the purpose of this Case Comment, consumer bankruptcy filings are
outside the scope.
18. See infra Part III, pp. 504-11.
19. See infra Part III, pp. 508-11.
20. See infra Part IV, pp. 511-13.
21. Der Hovanesian et al., supra note 16.
22. Credit Suisse v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re Yellowstone
Mountain Club, LLC), No. 08-61570-11, Adv. No. 09-00014, 2009 WL 3094930, at *2
(Bankr. D. Mont. May 12, 2009) (partial and interim order).
Yellowstone Club appeals to ultra-wealthy families as a second-home (or third-
home) location for its private recreational facilities (particularly the ski
area), views, proximity to winter and summer recreation. Prospective
buyers are required to have a net worth of over $3 million, but based
on the costs of membership and housing, we would expect nearly all
buyers to have an investable assets of at least $5 million, if not $10
million. The membership price for residents is $250,000 for a 30-year
refundable deposit.
Id. at *2 n.3.
23. Id. at *2.
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high of approximately $60 million on a revolving line of credit" to
finance specific portions of construction.24
In December 2004, Jeffery Barcy, a director of Credit
Suisse's investment banking division, sent several teaser emails
about a new "syndicated term loan" to Tim Blixseth.25 By offering
''real estate loans in the corporate bank loan market," Credit
Suisse, "was trying to break new ground., 26 Specifically, Credit
Suisse's syndicated term loans provided access to "a loan product
the size of which had previously been unavailable to [real estate]
borrowers., 27 To attract real estate developers like the Blixseths,
Credit Suisse structured the syndicated term loans to be similar to
home equity loans.28 Specifically, developers would be able to
distribute or lend some of the proceeds of the loan to equity
holders in the development for purposes unrelated to the
Yellowstone Club.29 At first, Tim Blixseth declined the syndicated
term loan but then decided that "he might have a use of the
proceeds for the loan and would be interested in talking again."3 °
Barcy and another Credit Suisse representative met Blixseth and
agreed to loan $150 million to the Yellowstone Club.3
Under the final credit agreement, however, Credit Suisse
loaned $375 million to the Yellowstone Club.32  Of the $375
million, approximately $24 million was allocated for purposes of
Yellowstone Club; Blixseth was allowed to distribute or lend $209
million for "'purposes unrelated' to the Yellowstone Club" and
invest an additional $142 million in "'unrestricted subsidiaries' for
24. Id. at *5.
25. Id. at *2 ("Barcy testified that Credit Suisse's syndicated loan product had
previously been marketed to other ... recreational communities such as Tamarack
Resort, Promontory, Ginn, Turtle Bay and Lake Las Vegas."). Id. at *3.
26. Id. at *3.
27. Id.
28. See In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, No. 08-61570-11, at *2; see also
Irvin W. Sandman et al, Hotel Owners, Lenders, and Stakeholders Square Off:
Equitable Subordination, GRAHAM & DUNN HART FORCE, May 27, 2009, http://
www.grahamdunn.com/go/articles/hotel-owners-lenders-and-stakeholders-square-off-
equitable-subordination (noting that the hotel industry should take notice of the
subordination of Credit Suisse's home equity-like loan product).
29. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, No. 08-61570-11, at *4.
30. Id. at *3 (quotation in original).
31. Id.
32. Id. at *5.
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'purposes unrelated' to the Yellowstone Club development. 3 3 At
the time the loan was distributed, Yellowstone Club had
"approximately $19 to $20 million in debt on its book."3
Prior to lending to Yellowstone Club, Credit Suisse
testified that it did "a fair amount" of legal and financial due
diligence. 35  This legal due diligence consisted of a criminal
background check on Blixseth and ensuring that Yellowstone Club
truly held the assets that were to serve as collateral. 36 To conduct
financial due diligence, Credit Suisse hired an independent
appraisal firm to assess Yellowstone Club's cash flows and "Total
Net Value," an appraisal metric created by Credit Suisse for its
syndicated term loans that is based on a debtor's projections and
not its audited financial statements.37
At trial, a certified insolvency advisor testified that
Yellowstone Club had experienced several years of negative cash
flow and had missed its "profitability projections [for the previous
nine months] by a substantial amount., 38 Although Credit Suisse
chose to rely on its "Total Net Value" metric, it was also aware
that the appraiser had previously conducted an "as-is" analysis of
Yellowstone Club for another bank and had valued the
development at $420 million "based on a discount rate of
18.5[%].,, 39 In spite of the "as-is" valuation and the "red flags"
related to cash flow, Credit Suisse entered into a credit agreement
with the Yellowstone Club.40 Immediately after the loan was
extended, Blixseth allocated $209 million of the $375 million loan
to BGI, which he later used for personal expenses, including real
estate purchases, payments on his luxury jet, and a 30,000 square
33. Id.
34. Id. (consisting of a line of credit and a term loan).
35. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, No. 08-61570-11, at *3; see Davis,
supra note 9.
36. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, No. 08-61570-11, at *3.
37. Id. (noting that Credit Suisse's Total Net Value metric was not in compliance
with the Financial Institutions Recovery Act of 1989 and that the valuations were
based on future projections provided by Blixseth).
38. Id. at *5 ("Such numbers show that [Yellowstone's] projections for the future,
upon which Credit Suisse relied without question, had no foundation in historical
reality."). Id.
39. Id. at *4.
40. Id. at *6.
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foot home in Palm Springs, California.4' Consequently, Credit
Suisse collected a $7.5 million fee upon distribution of the loan.42
Credit Suisse then proceeded to sell-off the Yellowstone Club loan
to third party investors.43
From the time the loan was extended to the filing of
bankruptcy, the Yellowstone Club remained behind on its
accounts payable to creditors and vendors.44 To obtain operating
funds, Blixseth sold Yellowstone Club lots to members at
"substantially reduced prices" instead of demanding repayment of
the Credit Suisse loan from BGI.45  Still unable to fund
improvements for the upcoming ski season, Yellowstone Club filed
for bankruptcy protection in November 2008 in the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Montana.46
In the subsequent interim order, Judge Kirscher held that
Credit Suisse's actions "were so far overreaching and self-serving
that they shocked the conscience of the Court" and held that
under Bankruptcy Code section 510(c) equitable subordination of
Credit Suisse's claim to that of an unsecured creditor was an
appropriate remedy.47 Judge Kirscher conceded that "equitable
subordination is seldom used in a non-insider, non-fiduciary
scenario" and that the requisite heightened "gross and egregious
conduct" must have been committed by the creditor in order to
subordinate.48
To support this holding, Judge Kirscher reasoned that the
"fee structure was undoubtedly the catalyst that led to the most
shocking aspect of Credit Suisse's newly developed loan
41. Kahrin Deines, Bankrupt Yellowstone Club Gets a Break-Sort of, SUMMIT
DAILY NEWS, May 13, 2009, http://www.summitdaily.com/article/20090513/NEWS/90
5139997/1078&ParentProfile=1055 (noting that Blixeth's accountant testified that $80
million of the loan was used for real estate purchases in Mexico, Scotland and
France).
42. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, No. 08-61570-11, at *5.
43. Id. at *8.
44. Id. at *6.
45. Id.
46. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, (Chapter 11) (Bankr. D. Mont.
Nov.10, 2008).
47. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, No. 08-61570-11, at *7-8; 11 U.S.C. §
510(c) (2006).
48. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, No. 08-61570-11, at *7 (citing In re
First Alliance Mortg. Co., 497 F.3d 977, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006)).
2010]
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product., 49 Following the collection of the transaction fees, Credit
Suisse encouraged loan officers to sell the Yellowstone Club loan
to third parties investors. ° Thus, by selling off the loan to third
parties, Judge Kirscher recognized that Credit Suisse had created a
scheme in which it was insulated from the risky loan but was still
collecting the $7.5 million in transaction fees.51 Consequently, the
larger the distribution of the loan to Yellowstone Club, the more
Credit Suisse would collect in transaction fees." He then
determined that Credit Suisse's new syndicated loan product was
nothing more than a plot, "driven by the fees it was extracting
from the loans it was selling, and letting the chips fall where they
may," and that Credit Suisse was "lin[ing] its pockets on the backs
of the unsecured creditors.,
53
To carry out the holding, Judge Kirscher ordered that
Credit Suisse "must provide sufficient funds to pay ... debtor-in-
possession financing, administrative fees, the cost of [Yellowstone
Club's] bankruptcy estate and the allowed unsecured claims of
non-member creditors," but would be permitted to submit a credit
bid of the $232 million secured claim during the auction of
Yellowstone Club's assets.54 Under a settlement agreement,
however, Kirscher approved a deal between CrossHarbor Equity
Partners (CrossHarbor) and Credit Suisse.55 The settlement
permitted CrossHarbor to purchase Yellowstone Club for $115
million dollars contingent upon the bankruptcy court vacating the
order to subordinate Credit Suisse's claim. 6 Judge Kirscher
vacated the order to subordinate and approved Yellowstone
Club's reorganization plan. 7
49. Id. at *8.
50. See id.
51. See id. at *5.
52. See id. at *8.
53. Id. at *9.
54. In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, No. 08-61570-11, at *10; see Non-
Insider Senior Lender, supra note 10.
55. See Non-Insider Senior Lender, supra note 10.
56. Id.; see also Ben Fidler, CrossHarbor Capital Wins Yellowstone Club, DAILY
DEAL, (May 19, 2009), available at 2009 WLNR 9895538 ("Credit Suisse will be
allowed to invest up to 15% of the equity in the new company, equal to about $30
million.").
* 57. See Non-Insider Senior Lender, supra note 10.
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After the interim order, in June 2009, Blixseth motioned
for a declaratory judgment claiming he "did not breach any
fiduciary duties," however, the Official Committee of Unsecured
Creditors and Debtors (Committee) claimed joint and several
liability of both Credit Suisse and Blixseth. s Expert forensic
accountant Kent Mordy testified that the $209 million that was
immediately transferred to BGI constituted a distribution "and a
return of capital to BGI and its then owner, Blixseth" and was not
a loan.59 The Committee argued that this amount should be
treated as a distribution, in which case the $209 million distribution
"should have reflected negative equity of approximately $141
million" and "left the [d]ebtors highly leveraged and with too little
capital with which to fund their financial plans and projections." 60
Blixseth's motion to dismiss this claim was denied.61
Yellowstone exemplifies a novel way for bankruptcy judges
to address predatory underwriting misconduct.62  The
subordination of Credit Suisse's claim reflects a higher level of
scrutiny courts may increasingly apply to creditors whose unjust
conduct contributed to the current credit crisis.63 The remainder of
this Case Comment examines how courts have commonly applied
the doctrine of equitable subordination and what ramifications a
58. Credit Suisse v. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors (In re Yellowstone
Mountain Club, LLC), 415 B.R. 769, 779 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009). The Committee
also claimed that Blixseth was the alter-ego of BGI and the proceeds of the Credit
Suisse loan constituted a fraudulent transfer. Id. For the purposes of this Case
Comment, these additional claims are outside the scope of discussion.
59. Id. at 788; see Credit Suisse v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re
Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC), No. 08-61570-11, Adv. No. 09-00014, 2009 WL
3094930, *4 (Bankr. D. Mont. May 12, 2009) (partial and interim order) (noting that
originally the proceeds unrelated to the business were drafted as loans, but were later
drafted as distributions to avoid tax consequences and negative owner's equity
accounts) (emphasis added).
60. Credit Suisse v. Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors (In re Yellowstone
Mountain Club, LLC), 415 B.R. 769,788 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009).
61. Id. at 791.
62. See id.
63. See Unwary Lender, supra note 7, at 1. But see Rathburn, supra note 16
(arguing that In re Yellowstone is simply an "outlier case" because if the Bankruptcy
Court did not subordinate Credit Suisse's claim, many local creditors and vendors
would not have received any money). "[A]ny bankruptcy judge looking to protect
businesses of the surrounding area could follow Yellowstone's lead and use the
doctrine of equitable subordination as a means to an end." Id. (underlining in
original).
2010]
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Yellowstone-type use of equitable subordination could have on
lenders.
III. EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION AND ITS APPLICATION TO NON-
INSIDERS
The doctrine of equitable subordination addresses
situations where creditor misconduct generated unjust inequity
among claimants" and is not intended to punish those
subordinated. 65 Equitable subordination, originally a common law
doctrine, is now codified at Section 510(c) of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code:
1) under principles of equitable subordination,
subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part
of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed
claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or
part of another allowed interest; or 2) order that any
lien securing such a subordinated claim be
transferred to the estate.66
Section 510(c) does not establish a bright line test.67 Instead,
Congress allowed bankruptcy courts to continue developing the
doctrine. 68 When a bankruptcy court subordinates a claim, the
court typically orders that the claimant will collect with or behind a
class of creditors or security holders.69 Equitable subordination
64. Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram, The Doctrine of Equitable
Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus. L. 417, 422 (1985).
65. Id.
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2006); see generally Mark G. Douglas, Bankruptcy
Court Empowered to Recharacterize Debt as Equity, Bus. RESTRUCTURING REV.,
Oct. 2003, at 1, 1-3, available at http://www.jonesday.com/newsknowledge/pub
licationdetail.aspx?publication=1414 (PDF available at link) (explaining the
difference between subordination and recharacterization).
67. DeNatale & Abram, supra note 64, at 421 ("[A]lthough the Bankruptcy Code
recognizes the possibility of equitable subordination of claims, it does not specify any
standards by which the doctrine is applied.").
68. Id. (citing 124 Cong. Rec. Hl, 095 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep.
Edwards) id. at S17, 412 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks of Sen. DecConcini)).
69. See e.g., Martino, supra note 4 ("Allows the court to re-prioritize a claim in
bankruptcy on account of inequitable conduct by the claimant.").
[Vol. 14
2010] IN RE YELLOWSTONE MOUNTAIN CLUB
has a significant effect on a creditor's ability to maintain a first lien
position and thus, be the first compensated from liquidation
proceedings. 0
Traditionally, bankruptcy courts have applied equitable
subordination under the Mobile Steel test.71 Based on Mobile Steel,
a bankruptcy court should subordinate a claim where "(1) the
claimant engaged in inequitable conduct, (2) the inequitable
conduct resulted in injury and disadvantage to other claimants,
and (3) subordination of the claim is consistent with the
Bankruptcy Code., 72 Bankruptcy courts have found inequitable
conduct in instances where a claimant engaged in "fraud, illegality,
or breach of fiduciary duties;" where a claimant's conduct caused
the debtor to become undercapitalized; 73 and where a "claimant[]
use[s] the debtor corporation as a mere instrumentality or alter
ego., 74 However, courts' treatment of inequitable conduct differs
depending on whether the creditor-debtor relationship constitutes
a relationship between insiders or non-insiders.
70. See RABINOWITZ & ROTENBERG, supra note 11, at § 8:26 ("Lender's goal in
workout is to reduce the potential for losses... [i]f the misconduct is established, the
entire unpaid balance owed to the lender can be equitably subordinated to the claims
of the other creditors and parties in interest. The last party out of a troubled
company may have a zero recovery."); see NUWIRE INVESTOR, Definition of First
Lien Position, http://www.nuwireinvestor.com/wiki/pages/first-lien-position.aspx (last
visited Feb. 6, 2010).
71. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 699-700 (5th
Cir. 1977); see Jeremy W. Dickens, Note, Equitable Subordination and Analogous
Theories of Lender Liability: Toward a New Model of "Control, " 65 TEx. L. REV. 801,
809-10 (1987). Dickens's references to nonmanagement creditors are synonymous
with this Case Comment's references to insiders.
72. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d at 700.
73. In re Herby's Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d 128, 131-32 (5th Cir. 1993) ((citing
Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.) 926 F.2d 1458,
1469 (5th Cir. 1991)) ("Capitalization is also inadequate 'if, at the time when the
advances were made, the bankrupt could not have borrowed a similar amount of
money from an informed outside source.' Even though undercapitalization alone
generally does not justify equitable subordination, evidence of additional inequitable
conduct may do so. For example, if an insider makes a loan to an undercapitalized
corporation, the combination of undercapitalization and the insider loan may allow
the bankruptcy court to recharacterize the loan as a capital contribution, or to
equitably subordinate the loan to the claims of other creditors."); Pepper v. Litton
308 U.S. 295, 309-10 (1939).
74. See, e.g., In re Herby's Foods, Inc., 2 F.3d at 131.
75. See Justin R. Fogarty et al., Lender Liability in Corporate Finance
Transactions and Equitable Subordination in the U.S. - Towards a Canadian
Perspective, 21 NAT'L INSOLVENCY REV. 49, 49 (2004), available at http://www.free
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Courts typically apply equitable subordination when
insiders, such as corporate officers, directors, or managers, all of
whom are fiduciaries of the debtor, commit misconduct.76 They
• • 77
are less likely to subordinate the claims of non-insiders.
Commercial transactions between lenders and their debtors are
usually determined to be that of non-insiders because no fiduciary
duty exists. 8 Case law holds that "[c]laims arising from dealings
between a debtor and an insider are rigorously scrutinized., 79 By
contrast, courts apply a "gross and egregious" standard to dealings
between the debtor and non-insiders to determine whether
equitable subordination should be applied to the non-insider's
claims.80 Thus, courts are less likely to subordinate claims of non-
insiders who have engaged in misconduct unless the non-insider's
conduct satisfies the "gross and egregious" standard.81
In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.82 highlighted the "gross
and egregious" standard. There, non-insider claimants sought to
subordinate a $77 million secured claim to those of unsecured
bornpeters.com/docs/publications/Lender%20Liability%20in%20Corporate%2OFina
nce%20Transactions%20and%20Equitable%2OSubordination%20in%20the%20U.S
.%20-%20%2OTowards%20a%20Canadian%20Perspective.pdf; Martino, supra
note 4; Dickens, supra note 71, at 816 (noting that application of gross and egregious
conduct is difficult to delineate in practice) (quotations omitted).
76. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) (2006); see Dickens, supra 71, at 802. For a more
current definition of insider, see 11 U.S.C.S. § 101(26) (2009) (defining an insider as
one who has a sufficiently close relationship with the debtor and subject to closer
scrutiny than those dealing at arm's length with the debtor); see infra note 81.
77. E.g. Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th
Cir. 1990).
78. See Dickens, supra note 71, at 814-15.
79. BANKRUPTCY §10.11, supra note 12, at 10-103.
80. See In re First Alliance Mortgage Co., 471 F.3d 977, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006)
(citing In re Pacific Express, Inc. 69 B.R. 112, 116 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986). "The
primary distinctions between subordinating the claims of insiders versus those of non-
insiders lie in the severity of misconduct ... [w]here non-insider egregious conduct
must be proven with particularity." Id.
81. See Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank, 908 F.2d at 1356 ("Cases
subordinating the claims of creditors that dealt at arm's length with the debtor are
few and far between."); Credit Suisse v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In
re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC), No. 08-61570-11, Adv. No. 09-00014, 2009 WL
3094930, at *9 (Bankr. D. Mont. May 12, 2009) (partial and interim order) (finding no
evidence to suggest that Blixseth and Credit Suisse were not dealing at arm's length,
as depicted when "Credit Suisse, via Barcy, and Blixseth ultimately agreed to 'flip a
coin' to decide the [transaction] rate").
82. In re First Alliance Mortgage Co., 471 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2006).
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creditors. First Alliance was a subprime mortgage lender
underwritten by Lehman Brothers (Lehman) that "utilize[d]
marketing methodology designed to target individuals who had
built up substantial equity in their homes, many of whom were
senior citizens." ' During the late 1990's, First Alliance's lending
practices, especially to elderly homeowners, "became subject to
increasing scrutiny including allegations that the borrower's loans
were fraudulently induced and that First Alliance deceived
borrowers into paying large loan origination fees."85  When the
predatory practices became publicized,86 many of First Alliance's
81
secondary lenders withdrew their funding, but not Lehman. In
1999, even after Lehman conducted an internal investigation that
revealed First Alliance's "unfavorable" and "unethical" business
practices, "Lehman stepped forward to provide a $150 million
credit line and became First Alliance's sole source of... funding
and underwriting., 88  Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that equitable subordination of Lehman's claim was not an
appropriate remedy because Lehman did not engage in
inequitable conduct, thereby failing the first step of Mobile Steel.89
83. See id. at 1006.
84. Id.. at 983-984.
85. Id. at 985. In 1998, seven state Attorney Generals and the U.S. Department
of Justice launched an official investigation on First Alliance's lending practices.
Additionally, American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) quickly filed suit.
Id.
86. See Diana B. Henriques, Lehman Aided in Loan Fraud, Jury Says, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/06/17/business/
lehman-aided-in-loan-fraud-j ury-says.html?pagewanted=l.
87. In re First Alliance Mortgage Co., 471 F.3d at 986.
88. See In re First Alliance Mortgage Co., 471 F.3d at 987 (9th Cir. 2006)
("[A]ccording to the terms of their agreement, Lehman made secured loans to First
Alliance by advancing 95 [%] of the value of the mortgages First Alliance pledged as
collateral."). Id.
89. See id. at 1007.
The Trustee based his claim to equitable relief on the theory that by aiding and
abetting First Alliance's fraud, Lehman's actions increased the amount
of creditors and claims, thus depleting the pro rata share that each
creditor would have of the remaining assets. At first blush, the
Trustee's argument has a certain allure, because there is surely
something "inequitable" in an abstract sense about aiding and abetting
fraud. Upon closer look, the success of this argument requires us to
treat the standard for holding Lehman liable for aiding and abetting
First Alliance's fraud... as a stand-in for inequitable conduct under the
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings, moreover,
that "Lehman's conduct does not demonstrate 'gross' or
'egregious' misconduct that "shocks the conscience of the court. ' '9°
Generally, non-insiders' secured claims will be
subordinated under the "gross and egregious" standard if they
engaged in "gross misconduct tantamount to fraud, overreaching
or spoliation to the detriment of others," 9 which must be "proven
with particularity." 92 As the court's analysis in In re First Alliance
Mortgage Co. proves, "the circumstances are few and far
between." 93 The majority of cases that have satisfied the "gross
and egregious" standard have involved fraud or misrepresentation
94by the creditor. However, inequitable conduct between non-
insiders can stem from underwriting misconduct between the
lender and debtor, not only from creditors' fraud or
misrepresentation. 9
In determining whether to subordinate a secured creditor's
interests, courts have relied on the presumption that "creditor
conduct within the express written terms of a contract is
presumptively not inequitable., 96  Thus, bankruptcy courts
typically do not look beyond the terms of the loan when
determining whether the non-insider's misconduct satisfies the
inequitable conduct requirement.97  This presumption is also
referred to as a "formalist contracts-right presumption. '" 98 For
test for equitable subordination of bankruptcy claims. This we cannot
do.
Id.
90. Austin v. Chisick (In re First Alliance Mortgage Co.), 298 B.R. 652, 668 (C.D.
Cal. 2003).
91. See, Dickens supra note 71, 815 (footnote omitted).
92. In re First Alliance Mortg. Co., 497 F.3d 977, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006).
93. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted).
94. Dickens, supra note 71, 815.
95. DeNatale & Abram, supra note 64, at 432 ("The most commonly feared
equitable subordination cases arise in connection with allegations of domination and
control on the part of a nonmanagement creditor, generally a financial institution.").
96. See Jay L. Koh, Equity Unbound: A Meaningful Test for Equitable
Subordination, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 467, 471 (1998) (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 487.
98. Id. at 473.
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example, in In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co. (Clark Pipe 1),99 the
Fifth Circuit issued a revised opinion rejecting its original ruling
and determined that the conduct of a non-insider creditor,
Associates Commercial Corporation (Associates), did not
constituted inequitable conduct over the debtor (Clark).1°° The
court stated:
Upon reconsideration, we have concluded that we
cannot say that the sort of control Associates
asserted over Clark's financial affairs rises to the
level of unconscionable conduct necessary to justify
the application of the doctrine of equitable
subordination. We have reached our revised
conclusion primarily because we cannot escape the
salient fact that, pursuant to its loan agreement with
Clark, Associates had the right to reduce funding,
just as it did, as Clark's sales slowed ....
In our original opinion, we failed to focus
sufficiently on the loan agreement, which gave
Associates the right to conduct its affairs with Clark
in the manner in which it did.01
The Clark Pipe II court highlights the presumption that "[i]f a
creditor has acted within the rights articulated in a contract with a
debtor, the creditor will be presumed not to have engaged in
inequitable conduct for the purposes of equitable
subordination." 10 2
99. In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co., 893 F.2d 693 (5th Cir. 1990); see Koh, supra
note 96, at 472 (noting that the Fifth Circuit originally affirmed the bankruptcy
court's equitable subordination of Associate's assets).
100. In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co., 893 F.2d at 702 (discussing that Associates
knew that Clark was heading into bankruptcy and therefore, sought to postpone
bankruptcy in order to recover the majority of its investment). The Court held that
"Associates was not a fiduciary of Clark, it did not exert improper control over
Clark's financial affairs, and it did not act inequitably in exercising its rights under its
loan agreement with Clark." Id.
101. Id. at 699-700.
102. See Koh, supra note 96, at 473.
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The Yellowstone decision is novel because the bankruptcy
court considered Credit Suisse's underwriting practices to
constitute misconduct. 3 Traditionally, bankruptcy courts have
been reluctant to subordinate creditors' claims in cases where
parties have contracted the terms of their agreement, such as the
loan agreement between Credit Suisse and Yellowstone Club.
14
Courts should look beyond the express terms of the loan, as Judge
Kirscher attempted to do in Yellowstone when making a
determination of inequitable conduct.105
Judge Kirscher found that Credit Suisse's underwriting
practices warranted subordination even for non-insiders. 106 To
determine that the threshold standard of "gross and egregious"
conduct was satisfied, the Yellowstone Bankruptcy Court relied
primarily on the following five facts:
(1) Credit Suisse created a "new" credit valuation
analysis that failed to consider historical or current
financial statements;
(2) Credit Suisse planned to resell the loan to third-
party investors, instead of retaining it on the loan
books;
(3) the majority of the loan could be used for
purposes unrelated to the business;
(4) Credit Suisse earned large fees for a loan
product that was "unnecessary" to the debtor; and
(5) Credit Suisse made similar loans to other luxury
real estate developments that also resulted in
financial shambles. 1°7
Underwriting conduct, like that of Credit Suisse and Lehman,
reflects a reliance on the presumption that bankruptcy courts will
103. See infra pp. 501-04; DeNatale, supra note 64 (noting that because creditors
are making more risky investments, usually reserved for insiders, it is not surprising
why courts would be more inclined to use equitable subordination as a remedy to
combat misconduct.).
104. See Koh, supra note 96, at 469.
105. See id. at 467.
106. See supra pp. 501-02.
107. See Unwary Lender, supra note 7 (outlining Yellowstone's reasoning).
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hesitate to apply equitable subordination to remedy inequitable
contract terms.08  Judge Kirscher's application of equitable
subordination is consistent with the implicit duty of good faith
dealings employed by modern contract law.1°'
IV. YELLOWSTONE FOR NON-INSIDERS
Predatory underwriting should reach the threshold
requirement for inequitable conduct set forth in the Mobile Steel
test when the non-insider lender has controlling influence over the
debtor which results in an injustice to other creditors. ° Unlike in
Yellowstone, bankruptcy courts have generally been reluctant to
subordinate creditors' claims in cases where parties have
contracted the terms of their agreement."' Courts should,
however, scrutinize creditors' conduct in contractual relationships
where the creditor has indirect control vis-A-vis financial
domination.12  In some contracts, for example, where creditors
provide the "sole source of financing" or are in "exclusive control
of the debtor's source of income," a non-insider has the ability to
influence management decisions. 3 A non-insider can indirectly
control a debtor through financial domination.1 14 In these types of
situations, the creditor should be treated as a de-facto fiduciary
with the Mobile Steel test applied.'15
108. See Koh, supra note 96, at 476-77.
109. Id. at 477 ("Unlike the formalist contract-rights presumption, modern
contract law recognizes and requires an inquiry into the relations between the
contracting parties to determine whether a party's conduct is within contractual
rights.").
110. But see Dickens, supra note 71, at 832 (contending that financial domination
and management control must be found in order to make a finding of control for the
purpose of subordination) (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. See Dickens, supra note 71, at 821 (recognizing that there are limited
circumstances that give rise to financial domination by a non-insider). "Control
through financial domination is the ability to influence those individuals or groups
having voting or management control of the debtor." Id at 822; Koh, supra note 96, at
467; DeNatale, supra note 64, at 432 ("[a]lthough the existence of control does create
a duty to the other creditors, control alone does not automatically result in the
equitable subordination of a creditor's claim.").
113. Dickens, supra note 71, at 822.
114. Dickens, supra note 71, at 819.
115. Rabinowitz & Rotenberg, supra note 11, at §8:26 ("Where a noninsider
creditor stands in a controlling relationship with a debtor, the creditor may be treated
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Because equitable subordination can be a harsh remedy,
however, the doctrine should not be applied simply because a
lender is the "sole source of financing" or has "exclusive control of
the debtor's source of income."1 6  Rather, subordination is
appropriate when a lender gains financial domination because of
its previous underwriting conduct.! 7 In particular, courts should
consider whether creditors engaged in any predatory
underwriting. " " The court in Yellowstone did not err in subjecting
Credit Suisse's secured loan to equitable subordination." 9 Credit
Suisse exerted financial control by extending an "unnecessary
loan," motivated by transaction fees, to Yellowstone Club.'20
Equitable subordination has both direct and indirect costs
121
associated with its application. Direct costs include the
possibility of increased rates in transacting a loan agreement and
the expenses associated with litigation from a subordinated
claim.22  Indirect costs include increases in fees and rates
associated with obtaining a loan and a reduction in their
availability caused by lenders who fear that their secured loans can
be subordinated.12 3  For example, Yellowstone became cause for
litigation in January 2010, when Yellowstone Club, along with
three other high-end resort owners, filed a class action suit against
Credit Suisse "seeking damages on behalf of more than 3,000
as a fiduciary and held to a higher standard of conduct... [t]he primary distinction
between subordinating claims of insiders versus non-insiders lies in the severity of the
misconduct.., towards the debtor or its creditors."); see also supra pp. 508-10.
116. Dickens, supra note 71, at 831 ("[E]quitable subordination is tied inextricably
to the facts of each case"); Rabinowitz & Rotenberg, supra note 11, at § 8:26.
117. See supra pp. 510-11 and notes 103-15.
118. See Koh, supra note 96, at 467.
119. See supra p. 510 and note 109.
120. See Credit Suisse v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors (In re
Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC), No. 08-61570-11, Adv. No. 09-00014, 2009 WL
309430, at *8 (Bankr. D. Mont. May 12, 2009) (partial and interim order); see supra
pp. 501-02.
121. Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent Transfer, and
Sovereign Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 187 (2007) (arguing for the
application of subordination as a solution for odious debts).
122. Id.
123. Id. ("The less precise the definition of inequitable conduct, the larger the
range of behavior by creditors it will likely affect and the more uncertainty creditors
will face about their potential liability.").
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investors who purchased property" in those developments.24 The
property owners claim that Credit Suisse "engaged in a plan to
artificially inflate the values of the resort so it could make huge
loans" and thus, collect high fees.'25 According to the complaint,
"Credit Suisse raked in huge fees on loans against the properties,
which it syndicated and sold to hedge fund managers.' '126 The
owners also brought the suit against Cushman & Wakefield, Inc.,
the commercial appraisal firm that computed the valuations of the
property. 27
Both direct and indirect costs can be limited by referring to
Yellowstone as a guide to narrowly apply equitable subordination
in those instances where a lender's inequitable underwriting
permits financial domination over the debtor.28  Thus, the
"potential liability [of subordination] should reduce the incentives
for creditors to engage in harmful or inefficient opportunistic
behavior in the first place.' ' 29 Consequently, secured creditors will
be more apprehensive before engaging in predatory lending.'
3°
More importantly, the creditor misconduct will not disadvantage
junior creditors who have acted in good faith.31
V. CONCLUSION
Predatory loan agreements allow the lender to control the
debtor in a manner that could amount to non-insider inequitable
conduct. Although contractual agreements have typically
shielded lenders from subordination,' 3 Yellowstone suggests that
124. Jacqueline Palank, Luxury Property Owners Sue Credit Suisse for $24 Billion,
WALL ST. J., January 5, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274 87035809
04574638052691063912.html. Additionally, there is an expected 4,000 to 5,000 more
litigants to join the suit and an additional ten other resorts. Id.; supra note 25.
125. Id.
126. Jim Robbins Credit Suisse Is Accused of Defrauding Investors in 4 Resorts
N.Y. TIMES, B1 January 5, 2010 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/
business/05resorts.html?scp=l&sq=yellowstone %20club&st=cse.
127. Palank, supra note 127.
128. Feibelman, supra note 121, at 188.
129. Id. at 189.
130. See supra p. 513 and notes 121-23, 128-29.
131. See supra p. 512 and note 109.
132. See Rabinowitz & Rotenberg, supra note 11, at §8:26.
133. See supra pp. 508-10.
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courts may consider predatory underwriting as inequitable
conduct.13 4 Accordingly, courts may be more willing to review the
suspicious dealings of lenders with a critical lens."' Consequently,
subordinating claims of predatory lenders would encourage all
lenders to consider more diligently the risk to the debtor and their
other creditors before offering risky loans; otherwise, their first
lien position risks being moved to the back of the line in
bankruptcy proceedings.
13 6
MARINA MONTES
134. See supra Part II, pp. 499-502 and note 9.
135. See supra notes 7, 9, and 103.
136. See supra p. 512 and notes 121-23.
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